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Returning Prosecutions to the States:
A Proposal for a Criminal Justice Restoration Act 
by John A. Humbach, Pace Law School
White Plains, New York
jhumbach@law.pace.edu
A small change in the wording of an existing Federal statute could save 
billions of dollars in the Federal budget. Our nation’s expensive and 
largely redundant Federal justice bureaucracy could be reduced to a 
fraction  of  its  size by restoring to  the states  their  traditional  role  of 
prosecuting crimes falling under state jurisdiction.  Restoring criminal 
justice functions to the states could achieve a surprisingly substantial 
decrease in both Federal spending and the reach of Federal power.  
This essay sets out and briefly analyses such a proposal.
In the past year, the calls to reduce the size of government and Federal spending 
seem to be growing louder and more urgent.1 Claims are made that the government in 
Washington has grown beyond its constitutional mandate,  becoming not only a costly 
burden but also an increasing threat to the liberty, economic stability and the quality of 
American life. 
While some of these claims may be debatable, it is almost certainly true that, as a 
historical matter, the Federal role in American governance has expanded far beyond what 
the Framers of the Constitution envisioned. In particular, the balance of power between 
the originally “sovereign” states and the national government has shifted enormously, and 
an ever greater  concentration of power in Washington is  supplanting the states’  once 
predominant  role.  Instead  of  being  a  government  of  limited  powers,  the  Federal 
government is now at the point where there seems to be little it cannot do, few kinds of 
laws it cannot enact, and virtually no enforceable constitutional limits on its power to tax 
and borrow in order to fund its ever widening range of activities. 
This slow but steady evolution over the past 220 years may be for good or ill but, 
in the minds of a growing number of Americans, it has become a source of concern. The 
question is:  Can anything still  be done about it?  The central  government  has already 
amassed a huge national debt, with obligations to pay interest,2 not to mention principal, 
that significantly “mortgages” our economic future to overseas creditors such as China. 
1 In a New York Times/CBS News poll of Tea Party backers and the general public, 50% of the general 
public (and 92% of Tea Party supporters) prefer a small Federal government spending less money on 
services. POLLING THE TEA PARTY (April 14, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/04/14/us/politics/20100414-tea-party-poll-graphic.html#tab=3.
2 When interest rates return to more normal levels (say, 5% per annum), the cost of interest alone will be 
about $600 billion per year, which would equal about 17% of 2010 Federal spending.
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Meanwhile, our national defense policies and commitments have fostered an international 
dependency on the U.S., meaning it would not be easy or, arguably, even safe for our 
military to withdraw or demobilize. At home our Federal public benefit programs, such 
as Social Security and Medicare, have already occupied so much of their respective fields 
that vast numbers of people not merely rely on them but generally believe, without much 
question, that they are essential. It is obvious, however, that if present trends continue it 
will not be long before virtually all governmental power on matters of significance will 
be  centralized  in  Washington.  For  those  who  want  to  turn  these  trends  around,  the 
question is, therefore, how it can be done? How can the balance of governmental power 
be shift  back toward the states without destabilizing disruptions or head-on collisions 
with almost irresistibly entrenched political interests?
Everyone  who  seeks  to  grapple  with  how  to  reduce  the  size  of  the  Federal 
government is confronted with the reality that both social benefit programs and military 
spending are difficult to cut. However, one place where reductions in Federal size should 
be relatively easy is by focusing on programs that parallel or duplicate existing programs 
in the states. A prime example is in the field of criminal justice. 
Over the last century the Federal government has taken over from the states a 
substantial part of the prosecutions for ordinary day-to-day violations.3 This Federal take-
over has not been shown to be really necessary,  but passing laws that authorize it has 
been a way for members of Congress to show that they are “doing something,” that they 
deserve re-election. In the meantime, however, the states have remained fully capable of 
carrying  out  ordinary law-enforcement  functions  without  Federal  intervention  and,  of 
course, they do so every day. In fact, in the case of persons under age 18, the policy of 
leaving the job the states is already a part of the law.4 Congress has already prescribed 
that, as a general rule, no one under 18 can be prosecuted in any Federal court unless the 
Attorney  General  certifies,  for  example,  that  no  "appropriate  court  of  a  State”  has 
jurisdiction or that the state court “refuses to assume jurisdiction” over the case and that 
there is a “substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense.”5 
3 See infra notes 6-15.
4 18 U.S.C. §5032. The section reads, in pertinent part:
§ 5032.  Delinquency proceedings in district court; transfer for criminal prosecution 
A juvenile alleged to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency, other than a violation of law 
committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States for which 
the maximum authorized term of imprisonment does not exceed six months, shall not be 
proceeded against in any court of the United States unless the Attorney General, after 
investigation, certifies to the appropriate district court of the United States that (1) the juvenile 
court or other appropriate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume 
jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such alleged act of juvenile delinquency, (2) the 
State does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or (3) the 
offense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony or an offense described in section 401 of the 
Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C. 841], or section 1002(a), 1003, 1005, 1009, or 1010(b)(1), 
(2), or (3) of the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act [21 U.S.C. 952(a), 953, 955, 959, 
960(b)(1), (2), (3)], section 922(x) [18 U.S.C. § 922(x)] or section 924(b), (g), or (h) of this title 
[18 U.S.C. § 924(b), (g), or (h)], and that there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the 
offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.
5 Id.
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One obvious way to achieve a substantial reduction in the size and intrusiveness 
of the Federal establishment would be to extend this rule of Federal abstention to persons 
who are over 18 as well—restoring the job of ordinary criminal justice to the states. A 
Criminal Justice Restoration Act could achieve this reduction quite simply: All it would 
take is to remove the age limit from the existing law for juvenile cases and clarify that the 
required Federal interest be a  uniquely Federal interest,  i.e.,  one that is reserved to the 
Federal government under the United States Constitution. This small legislative change, a 
few words in a single section of the United States Code, could make a major inroad in the 
degree to which Federal power holds sway within the states, and it would be an major 
step  in  the  direction  of  reducing  the  Federal  government  to  a  more  constitutionally 
appropriate size
The Federalization of Ordinary Criminal Justice. In some federated nations, 
such  as  Canada,  the  criminal  law  is  almost  totally  a  matter  of  federal  law,  and the 
national constitution gives the provinces or states only limited jurisdiction over crime. In 
the United States, however, there is a long and strong traditional of treating public safety 
and criminal redress primarily as matters of state responsibility. In America, criminal law 
has, until fairly recently, been almost exclusively state law.
Over the decades, however, especially in the last half-century, the government in 
Washington has increasingly taken it upon itself to prosecute and punish ordinary crimes. 
In the process, it has built up a parallel criminal justice bureaucracy whose function and 
operations largely duplicate what already exists in the states. As a result,  the Federal 
government now holds more than 180,000 people in its prisons,6 representing an increase 
of nearly 30% over the year 2000, with an average increase of 4.5% per year.  These 
Federal prisoners are mostly held for acts that traditionally were already crimes under 
state law:
Crime                                        Prisoners  7 
Homicide    2949
Robbery    8718
Other violent crime    3817
Burglary      475
Fraud    7728
Other property crimes    2876
Drug crimes  95079
Gun ownership crimes, etc.  26928
Sex crimes, etc.  12678
Of the total Federal prisoners, only those convicted of immigration offenses (19,6788) 
and a  small  number  of  others  (listed as “other/unspecified”  offenses)9 fall  within the 
Federal  government’s  exclusive  constitutional  jurisdiction.  Virtually  all  of  the  rest  of 
6 William J. Sabol, Heather C. West & Matthew Cooper, PRISONERS IN 2008, Bureau of Justice Statistics 
Bulletin, U.S. Department of Justice 38 (December, 2009)(reporting 182,333 persons held in 2008). 
7 Id. (2008 figures). 
8 Id.
9 Id. The total held for “other/unspecified” offenses is 1,394. 
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come under Federal authority, not because of any unique constitutional interest or nexus, 
but solely because the Supreme Court’s broad reading the commerce power allows the 
Federal government to selectively pre-empt traditional state control.
Federal involvement in ordinary law enforcement, pursuing conduct that has no 
uniquely Federal  nexus, seems if anything to be growing. During the decade between 
1997 and 2006, Federal criminal prosecutions rose 34%10 despite the fact that the nation’s 
crime rate has been falling. But this Federal takeover of historically state jurisdiction does 
not come cheap. The U.S. Department of Justice currently spends around $25 billion per 
year, of which around $15 billion goes for law enforcement11 and nearly $7 billion to 
feed, house and secure the Federal government prisoners12 in 115 Federal prisons around 
the country.13 On top of this, operating the Federal court system costs another $7 billion 
per  year,14 the bulk of  which is  accounted  for  by criminal  prosecutions  and appeals. 
Added all together, this Federal criminal-justice activity is increasing the Federal deficit 
by close to $30 billion per year—or about $100 for every man, woman and child in the 
country.  This  may  not  seem  like  much,  but  these  expenditures  will,  if  allowed  to 
continue, add nearly half a trillion dollars to the national debt in just the next 12 years.15
Does the  Federalization  of  Criminal  Justice  Make  Sense? Whether  the 
taxpayers are receiving value for all this money spent on Federal justice is debatable. On 
one  hand,  the Federal  government’s  parallel  criminal-justice  bureaucracy  provides  an 
additional  a  layer  of  government  regulation  and  control  that  can  supplement  and,  if 
necessary,  backstop traditional state enforcement. If a state response is ineffective, the 
government in Washington can step in and pick up the slack. While this backup capacity 
has been of definite importance in dealing with the nation’s historically special problems 
in the area of civil rights, it is not so clear that it is otherwise indispensable. On the other 
hand, it is not obvious that always having an extra layer of government power and control 
is  good thing.  That  seems,  for  example,  to  be  the  core  message  of  the  “Tea  Party” 
movement  and other constitutional conservatives who believe the Federal  government 
has grown too large.
The  Federal  prosecution  establishment  is  an  important  vehicle  for  projecting 
Federal power into the states and in every corner of the nation. It is the primary means for 
making sure that the force of Federal power is felt,  even on traditionally non-Federal 
issues, across the 50 states. Presumably, the way one feels about this pervasive projection 
of Federal power depends how one feels about Federal power generally. 
10 http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/2007-11/decade/index.html
11 2010 Budget Summary and 2010 Budget Request by Strategic Goal (U.S. Department of Justice), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2010summary/pdf/bud-summary.pdf (last visited March 8, 2010).
12 Summary Budget of Federal Prisons System (BOP), available at  
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2011summary/pdf/fy11-bop-bud-summary.pdf (last visited March 8, 2010). 
Other “administration of justice” programs cost an added $2-3 billion per year. See 2010 Budget Summary 
and 2010 Budget Request by Strategic Goal (U.S. Department of Justice), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2010summary/pdf/bud-summary.pdf (last visited March 8, 2010).
13 Id.
14 JUDICIARY BUDGET: FACTS AND IMPACT, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/budget.html (last visited March 
8, 2010).
15 Assuming that the budgeted amounts continue to increase at about 3.5% per year.  
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Under the view prevailing in recent decades,  a strong nation requires a strong 
national government, and the concentration of increasing power in Washington is exactly 
what the country should be doing. On the other hand, under what might be called the 
“constitutional  conservative”  view,  state  government  is  the  level  of  government  that 
should have primary relevance to people’s day-to-day lives. Even though Washington has 
shaken off most of the formal limits on its power in the years since Wickard v. Filburn,16 
the argument goes, that does not mean it should take any power that it can. The mere fact 
that the Federal government legally can override the authority of the states does not mean 
that it should.
As mentioned earlier, all the current Federal criminal-justice activity is increasing 
the national deficit by close to $30 billion per year.17 Of course, turning prosecutions and 
punishment back over to the states does not mean their costs would entirely disappear. At 
the same time, however, it is almost certain that having two large and overlapping sets of 
bureaucracies, as we currently do, costs us far more than having only one. And there is 
every reason to think that the states could absorb the additional cases without budgetary 
burden. Returning criminal justice to the states would, on average, add only 2-3 cases 
(mostly plea bargains) to the monthly caseload per county. 
By contrast,  as things now stand every state has, not merely its own criminal-
justice apparatus, but also one or more fully staffed U.S. Attorney’s offices. Each of the 
Federal operations is, in effect, a large law office with its own management costs, its own 
separate facilities and its own separate overhead expenses. Whatever the exact cost of all 
this duplication, it is a cost that is probably too much at a time when every additional 
dollar of Federal spending has to be, in effect, borrowed overseas. Indeed, duplicating 
government functions seems be the very paradigm of “waste and abuse.” 
Even apart from cost, however, there are constitutional policy concerns that may 
cause us to question whether having two duplicative prosecution authorities is really good 
for liberty. The traditional constitutional ideal of centering most governmental power in 
the states, not in Washington, has already been mentioned, but there are other concerns as 
well. For example, removing duplicative Federal prosecution capacity would eliminate 
most of the potential for “double jeopardy” that currently exists. Nowadays, both the state 
and Federal authorities can prosecute an accused for one and the same act—something 
that goes against the spirit if not the letter of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Then there is 
the somewhat uncomfortable fact that many Federal prosecutions, an estimated 18% in 
2006, are secret, shielded from public view.18 Beyond that, Federal prosecution power 
can  be  (and has  been)  used  anti-democratically  for  the  express  purpose  of  defeating 
freedoms established by the states.19 
16 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (greatly increasing the Federal power to make laws under the Commerce Clause).
17 See supra note 15.
18 Molly McDonough, 18 Percent of Federal Criminal Cases There Are Shielded From Public, Study Says, 
5 ABA JOURNAL EREPORT 10 (March 10, 2006),   
19 For example, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding the Federal power to convict and imprison 
persons growing and using marijuana, as expressing permitted under otherwise valid state laws). 
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Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the very existence of a large and versatile 
Federal  prosecution  force  supplies  a  natural  temptation  to  adopt  ever  new  kinds  of 
Federal laws of the kind that have, over time, radically expanded the power and reach of 
the  Federal  government.  Many  of  these  laws  are  supposed  to  deal  with  so-called 
“national” problems. Often, however, the “national” problem turns out to be, in reality, 
just another ordinary state-level problem that happens to be shared by a number of states. 
Since nearly every substantial challenge that a state faces is likely also to be faced by 
other states as well, there is a constant supply of so-called “national” issues, and they 
provide a fertile source for the continuing extensions of Federal power, expanding it into 
every  corner  of  the  nation’s  life.  If  the  Federal  government  adopted  a  policy  not  to 
prosecute cases within the traditionally state purview, it would take away an incentive 
(or, at least, make it less easy) for the Federal government to use its “commerce” power 
to intrude on the state’s historical domain.
Drawing the Line on Federal Prosecutions. As stated earlier, an obvious way to 
reduce the size and intrusiveness of the Federal establishment would be to extend the rule 
of Federal abstention in criminal justice to cases involving persons over 18 and to stop 
the use of Federal funds for prosecutions do not involve uniquely Federal interests under 
the Constitution. This small change of only a few words in the United States Code would 
withdraw  the  Federal  government  from  the  business  of  launching  prosecutions  for 
conduct that the Constitution does not place in exclusively national jurisdiction (such as 
tariff enforcement) or acts that directly harm or impede the constitutional functioning of 
the Federal government itself (for example,  assaults on Federal officers, trespasses on 
Federal property or treason). All ordinary crimes, from homicide to drug offenses, would 
be left to the states. The states’ full traditional criminal justice power would be restored. 
 
Assuming that it is decided to restore most criminal-justice authority to the states, 
where should the line be drawn? What should count as a uniquely Federal nexus that 
would justify prosecution and punishment at the Federal level rather than by the states?  
Today, the Federal government exercises criminal justice jurisdiction under laws 
that fall in several different categories. One category consists of laws enacted to carry out 
and support powers that the Constitution delegates exclusively to the Federal level of 
government, for example laws pertaining to national security and border protection, the 
post office or the mint.  Another category consist  of laws that  are needed to regulate 
matters as to which the states are constitutionally disempowered,  for example laws to 
prevent  the  imposition  of  discriminatory  burdens  on  interstate  commerce.  And  still 
another category consists of laws designed to achieve results which, though necessary or 
desirable,  the  individual  states  simply  cannot  achieve  on their  own—for  example,  to 
protect interstate resources or to control interstate pollution. With respect to laws in these 
three categories, it is logical that any criminal sanctions be sought and imposed by the 
Federal  government  itself:  Particularly  within  the  exclusive  sphere  of  its  own 
constitutional mandate, the Federal government should not have to depend on others. 
There are, however, many other Federal laws that are either partially or totally 
redundant  with  state  laws—or  with  laws  that  states  could  have  enacted  but  did  not 
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because they opted for liberty instead.  As already shown in the chart set out earlier,20 
laws in this “redundant” category account for the vast majority of Federal criminal justice 
activity. To the extent that these laws are fully redundant with already existing state laws, 
they serve no obvious  purpose at  all—except  to  expand the  reach  of  Federal  power. 
When Federal laws cover matters that the states have opted not to regulate, the situation 
is even worse. Such laws seem to represent a flat-out Federal  intrusion on the state’s 
choice not to impose particular limits on their citizens’ liberty, to leave their citizens in 
peace.21 
Oftentimes the redundant laws are enacted with good intentions, for example to 
provide  Federal  support  for  the  state  policies  whose  enforcement  might  tend  to  be 
frustrated due to the interstate nature of a problem. A classic example is the National 
Motor Vehicle Theft Act.22 The invention of the automobile resulted in a new class of 
mobile assets that were highly attractive to thieves. It was apparently an easy matter for 
car thieves to escape detection by driving stolen cars across state lines. The states had 
laws punishing car theft, of course, but the law enforcement authorities inside each state 
were hobbled by the territorial limits on their authority. The cars’ mobility simply outran 
them.  By  prohibiting  interstate  transportation  of  stolen  vehicles,  the  National  Motor 
Vehicle Theft Act gave the national police (viz. the F.B.I.) the legal power to investigate 
interstate car thefts and apprehend the thieves. 
Clearly,  problems of the kind that motivated the National Motor Vehicle Theft 
Act are still with us today, but the precise solution provided by that Act, a new Federal 
crime,  was not necessary then nor is  such a solution necessary now. While  having a 
national police force is valuable for resolving interstate crimes, it does not follow that we 
also need to have a national bureaucracy to carry out the prosecutions or punishments. In 
the case of car theft, for example, once the thieves are apprehended by a national agency 
such as the F.B.I., the Federal government’s necessary role is over. At that point the state 
where  the  crime  occurred  has  just  as  much  legal  capability  (and  rightful  claim)  to 
prosecute  the  wrongdoer  as  a  Washington-based  bureaucracy.  Federal  investigation 
agencies are obviously valuable, but in a true “federal” democracy the involvement of 
such  agencies  would  be  at  the  request and  in  the  service of  the  states,  not  as  a 
superimposition  on  them.  That  is,  at  least,  consistent  with  the  constitutional  plan 
envisioned by the Founders. 
There is certainly no practical reason why, in the name of strengthening our de-
centralized  federal  system,  agencies  like  the  F.B.I.  cannot  provide  law-enforcement 
assistance  without  the  further  step  of  federally  preempting  the  prosecution  and 
punishment as well. Indeed, the F.B.I.’s crime laboratory already provides an excellent 
example.  It  represents a valuable  forensic service that  the government  in Washington 
20 See supra text accompanying notes 6-15.
21 Note that I would distinguish in this discussion those Federal laws passed pursuant to constitutional 
provisions such as the 14th and 15th amendment which (unlike, say, the Commerce Clause) were 
specifically motivated by a purpose to rein in certain kinds of evils considered tolerable by certain of the 
states but intolerable by the nation as a whole. 
22 18 U.S.C.A. § 408. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 35 (1931).
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provides to the states without, in the process, supplanting them. It is a model that is true 
to the Constitution’s intent.
Conclusion.  In sum,  the Constitution  was not  intended to focus governmental 
power in the central government while the states gradually atrophy away. The individual 
states, some of which are larger than most countries, are fully capable of handling their 
own systems for criminal justice. This fact certainly raises the question, at least: Do we 
really need the ongoing Federal takeover of prosecutions? Yet, based on present trends, a 
Federal  takeover  of  large  portions  of  the  American  justice  system  continues  almost 
unquestioned. But is the continuation of present trends an inevitable progression?
If the trend is not inevitable, then enactment by Congress of a Criminal Justice 
Restoration Act, returning ordinary criminal justice functions to the states, would be a 
significant step in reversing the accumulation of power in Washington. All that is needed 
is to change a few words in one section of the United States Code, extending the existing 
Federal abstention in juvenile cases to all criminal cases. No large Federal program is as 
easy to turn back over to the states as the prosecution of crimes that fall within the states’ 
traditional purview.
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